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The revised framework for capital regulation of internationally active banks (known as Basel II)
introduces risk-based capital requirements. This paper analyses the relationship between bank
capital, lending and macroeconomic activity under the new capital adequacy regime. It extends a
model of the bank-capital channel of monetary policy - developed by Chami and Cosimano - by
introducing capital constraints àl aBasel II. The results suggest that bank capital is likely to be
less variable under the new capital adequacy regime than under the current one, which is
characterised by invariant asset risk-weights. However, bank lending is likely to be more
responsive to macroeconomic shocks.
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5Summary
The process of reforming the 1988 Basel Accord, that started in 1999, has been motivated by the
goal of more closely matching regulatory capital to the risk proﬁle of banks’ asset portfolios. The
rationale for minimum capital requirements is that they mitigate ﬁnancial institutions’ moral
hazard. Regulators are imposing a cost on bank owners to ‘encourage’ them to avoid costly
default. However, the limited number of risk categories in the current framework has created
opportunities for banks to increase the risk to which they are exposed without increasing the
amount of regulatory capital.
T h en e wB a s e lA c c o r di sw i d e l yr e c o g n i s e da sam u c h needed effort to deal with the shortcomings
of the current system. By realigning capital adequacy rules with banks’ incentives it aims at
restoring the link between risk and capital holding. Nonetheless, a number of questions have been
raised by central bankers, regulators and practitioners regarding the impact of a more
risk-sensitive regulatory framework on macroeconomic stability. Among them, there is the issue
of the potential procyclical effects of the new capital adequacy requirements, ie the possibility that
during periods of weak economic growth, a fall in capital ratios and an increase in regulatory
requirements implied by a deterioration in the risk proﬁle of banks’ assets might increase the
likelihood of credit contraction and, therefore, a further weakening of growth.
This paper analyses the relationship between banks’ capital holdings, banks’ loans and
macroeconomic activity under risk-sensitive capital adequacy requirements. In particular, it
compares the impact of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ choices of capital structure and loan
supply under the old and new capital adequacy regimes. It does so by extending a model that
investigates the impact of monetary policy on lending in an economy where banks operate in an
oligopolistic market and are subject to minimum capital requirements. In order to analyse banks’
reaction to changes in macroeconomic conditions under the new capital adequacy regime, I extend
the model by assuming a link between loan risk-weights and borrowers’ creditworthiness. In
particular, I introduce asset risk-weights that vary with macroeconomic performance, which is a
major determinant of credit risk.
The ﬁrst result of the paper is that the response of banks to shocks that affect loan demand differs
when the minimum capital requirements are calculated with asset risk-weights that are sensitive to
7macroeconomic conditions. In particular, bank capital is less volatile than under capital
requirements with constant risk-weights. The intuition behind this result can be understood by
considering, for example, a positive shock to macroeconomic conditions that increases both
current and future loan demand. If the capital constraint is binding, banks may not be able to
expand loan supply in the current period and they may need to raise capital to increase supply in
the future. Therefore, if capital requirements do not change with borrowers’ risk, capital increases
in response to positive macroeconomic shocks and decreases after negative shocks. But when
asset risk-weights depend on macroeconomic conditions, bank capital might not need to increase
for banks to be able to expand their credit supply. In fact, following a positive macroeconomic
shock the risk-weights decrease and the capital constraint thus become looser. This insight has an
important policy implication. On the one hand banks will tend to operate above the minimum
regulatory capital to avoid the capital constraint becoming binding in future periods. On the other
hand banks may not voluntarily accumulate capital in times of good macroeconomic conditions
because it is during these times that the capital constraint becomes looser. This means that if
banks are affected by an adverse shock during a period of credit expansion, they might be forced
to raise capital at a time when market conditions are unfavourable. A second and related result of
the paper concerns the effect of macroeconomic shocks on loan supply. Since capital is more
difﬁcult to accumulate in a recession, and easier to accumulate when the economy experiences a
p o s i t i v es h o c k ,b a n kc r e d i ti sl i k e l yt ob em o r ep rocyclical under the new Accord than under the
current one.
81 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between macroeconomic conditions, bank
capital and lending when banks are subject to risk-sensitive capital adequacy requirements as
envisaged in the new Basel proposals.(1)
The process of reforming the Basel Accord, begun in 1999, has been motivated by the goal of
more closely matching regulatory capital to the risk proﬁle of banks’ asset portfolios. The
rationale for minimum capital requirements is that they mitigate ﬁnancial institutions’ moral
hazard. Regulators are imposing a cost on bank owners to ‘encourage’ them to avoid costly
default. But the limited number of risk categories in the current framework has created
opportunities for banks to increase the risk to which they are exposed without increasing the
amount of regulatory capital. There are a number of ways in which banks are able to engage in
capital arbitrage. For example, banks can sell or securitise those assets for which the regulatory
capital charge is believed to be higher than the one markets would impose while keeping on the
books poorer quality assets for which the regulatory capital charge is relatively low.
T h en e wB a s e lA c c o r di sw i d e l yr e c o g n i s e da sam u c h needed effort to deal with the shortcomings
of the current system. By realigning capital adequacy rules with banks’ incentives it aims at
restoring the link between risk and capital holding. Nonetheless, a number of questions have been
raised by central bankers, regulators and practitioners regarding the impact of a more
risk-sensitive regulatory framework on macroeconomic stability. Among them, there is the issue
of the potential procyclical effects of the new capital adequacy requirements, ie the possibility that
during periods of weak economic growth, the rise in regulatory requirements implied by a
deterioration in the risk proﬁle of banks’ assets might lead to a reduction of credit supply and thus
reinforce the weakening of macroeconomic conditions.
Empirical evidence shows some support for the idea that the credit crunch experienced in the
United States during the 1990 recession might have been caused, or at least accentuated, by the
introduction of capital requirements. Bernanke and Lown (1991) use US state-level data on
individual banks to argue that, although demand factors might have caused much of the observed
slowdown in bank lending during the period, a shortage of equity capital limited banks’ ability to
(1) See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) for a description of the Basel II Accord.
9extend loans, particularly in the northeastern part of the country. Lower levels of bank capital
seem to have been the result of an increase in loan defaults and write-offs.(2)
If the weights used to set capital requirements are sensitive to changes in risk, as proposed under
the new Accord, required regulatory capital may increase at the same time that actual levels of
bank capital are decreasing. Risk-weights would increase during recessions because of a higher
probability of default and potentially also because of a higher loss given default on loans. So in
order to maintain a given ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, banks will need to hold more
regulatory capital. This rise in capital requirements would coincide with a period during which
banks’ proﬁts, and potentially actual capital, may be falling as a consequence of bad loans being
charged off. In a recent paper, Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2003) suggest that many
banks have moved towards point-in-time rating methods when determining credit risk. Under an
internal ratings based (IRB) approach to the implementation of the new capital adequacy
regulation, banks would therefore determine the risk-weights based on a Merton-type model
where current information on borrowers’ equity price and book liabilities is used to obtain
estimates of borrowers’ probabilities of default. Since cyclical effects in asset valuations would be
reﬂected in the default probabilities, the Merton-model approach delivers risk-weights that are
highly sensitive to current economic conditions.
Apart from Catarineu-Rabell et al, there are few papers that analyse the impact of capital
regulation on banks’ behaviour. However, over the past few years a related literature has emerged
which analyses the link between bank capital and lending in models of monetary policy.(3) In
addition to the more conventional mechanisms of propagation and ampliﬁcation of monetary
policy shocks, a new type of credit channel (a so-called ‘bank capital channel’) has been
identiﬁed.(4) According to the ‘bank capital channel’ view, a change in interest rates can affect
lending through banks’ capital. This transmission mechanism is operative when banks’ lending is
constrained by a capital adequacyr e q u i r e m e n t .A ni n c r e a s ei no f ﬁcial interest rates, for example,
will raise the cost of banks’ external funding, reduce their proﬁts and possibly their capital.
(2) For more evidence on the impact of capital requirements on bank lending see Jackson et al (1999), Hancock,
Laing and Wilcox (1995), Haubrich and Wachtel (1993), Thakor (1996) and Wagster (1999).
(3) See, among others, Bliss and Kaufman (2002), Chami and Cosimano (2001), Tsomocos (2003), and Van den
Heuvel (2001).
(4) See Van den Heuvel (2002) for a brief description of the various channels of monetary policy transmission.
10If the capital constraint becomes binding, banks will need to decrease their supply of credit.(5)
It is important, however, to notice that the bank capital channel may operate in response to factors
other than changes in monetary policy. Changes in regulatory policy or simply shocks to
macroeconomic conditions may also shift banks’ lending by affecting their regulatory capital
constraint. This last mechanism will be the focus of the analysis in this paper.
The impact of macroeconomic conditions on bank capital and loans is examined by using the
framework developed by Chami and Cosimano (2001). In their paper, Chami and Cosimano (C-C)
analyse the effect of monetary policy in an economy characterised by banks operating under
capital adequacy constraints in an imperfectly competitive loan market. The model assumes that
minimum capital requirements are constant over time àl aBasel I(6) and that bank loans are
risk-free. In order to analyse banks’ incentives and the impact of macroeconomic conditions on
banks’ choices under the new Accord, I introduce two key extensions. First, it is assumed that
borrowers can default and thus that banks make credit losses. Loan write-offs are modelled as
being dependent on macroeconomic conditions, consistent with empirical evidence that banks’
losses on loan portfolios are correlated with the business cycle, under any capital adequacy
regime. Second, asset risk-weigh t sa r ea s s u m e dt ov a r yo v e rt h eb u siness cycle. This assumption
intends to capture the link between loan risk-weights and borrowers’ creditworthiness established
in the new Basel rules.
In order to compare the impact of the current and revised capital adequacy standards (ie Basel I
and Basel II) on banks’ behaviour, I introduce the two extensions sequentially. First, I present the
results of the model under the assumption that banks make losses on loans but that risk-weights
are constant, as under Basel I. Then, I will show the consequences of asset risk-weights that vary
with macroeconomic conditions, as under Basel II.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a brief summary of the C-C
(5) In Chen (2001) a bank’s net worth can impact on lending without a capital adequacy constraint. Bank capital has
a role in overcoming the moral hazard problem arising from asymmetric information between banks, depositors and
borrowers.
(6) The ﬁrst Capital Accord, published in July 1988 and implemented by the end of 1992, prescribes minimum
capital to asset ratios. All assets are assigned to one of four buckets, which classify the riskiness of the respective
contract (eg loans to OECD governments, loans to OECD banks and other OECD public sector entities, residential
mortgage loans, loans to the private sector). The same constant risk-weight is then associated to the assets in the same
risk bucket.
11paper, Section 3 presents the extension to the C-C model and the main results, Section 4 concludes
and discusses further work.
2 Chami-Cosimano (2001)
The C-C paper analyses the bank capital channel of monetary policy by using a dynamic model in
which banks maximise the present value of future proﬁts, subject to a minimum capital-asset ratio.
In anticipating that the capital constraint may bind in the future, banks choose an optimal level of
dividend payouts (or, equivalently, capital) each period to minimise this possibility. Monetary
policy affects the supply of loans by affecting the value of holding bank capital. For example, a
tightening of monetary policy, which causes an increase in current and future deposit rates,
reduces banks’ current and future loan supply. A lower loan supply gives banks the incentive to
hold less capital. But a lower level of capital will make the constraint on future lending more
restrictive. In sum, contractionary monetary policy reduces future credit supply not only because it
increases the marginal cost of loans but also because it causes a reduction in banks’ capital.
Before brieﬂy presenting the model, I will discuss banks’ capital constraint and banks’ cash ﬂows
as presented by C-C.
The total capital constraint requires that the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital(7) be no less than a
given ratio of risk-adjusted assets:
θLt ≤ qt−1st + bt (1)
where qt−1st (Tier 1 capital) is the previous period’s market value of equity (price q at time t − 1
t i m e sn u m b e ro fs h a r e ss), Lt are one-period loans, bt are one-period bonds (subordinated debt in
the Basel Accord) issued in the previous period, and θ is the regulatory ratio of Tier 1 plus Tier 2
capital to risk-adjusted assets. To maintain the book value feature of regulatory capital, it is
assumed that last period’s market value of equity and bonds determines the capital constraint for
the present period.
(7) Tier 1 capital is the book value of a bank’s stock plus retained earnings. Tier 2 capital is the sum of loan-loss
reserves and subordinated debt.
12The following identity describes the sources and uses of cash ﬂows nt generated by the bank:






bt − qt (st+1 − st) − bt+1 (2)
where πt are proﬁts, dtst are dividend payments and rb
t is the interest rate on one-period bonds.(8)
The banking industry is assumed to operate in an oligopolistic market for loans: there are N banks
that charge a loan rate consistent with monopoly power. An individual bank precommits to a
quantity of loans through its capital holding (since the current choice of capital restricts the supply
of loans next period), and loan rate competition follows in the next period.
To characterise the equilibrium, C-C analyse the behaviour of a bank operating as a monopolist.(9)
The bank attracts deposits Dt at a ﬁxed marginal cost cD. The bank holds αDt as reserves against
withdrawals of money. Assume these withdrawals x come from a probability distribution f (x). If
at any time x exceeds the amount of marketable securities Tt (held in addition to reserves), then
the bank has to liquidate assets at a penalty rate r
p
t .
The bank faces the following loan demand:
Lt = l0 −l1r
L
t +l2Mt + εL,t (3)
where r L
t is the loan rate, Mt is a variable representing the level of macroeconomic activity and
(8) Bank proﬁts πt are used to meet obligations: dividend payments on equity, and interest and principal payments
on bonds, such that retained earning are described by ret = πt − dtst − (1 +rb
t )bt. Banks should also invest in plant
and equipment each period. For simplicity we can assume that there is no investment in new physical capital and that
the depreciation rate of banks’ capital stock is ψ. Banks ﬁnance the depreciation ψkt through retained earnings, new
equity or new bonds: ψkt = ret + qt(st+1 − st) such that the net cash ﬂow is given by
nt ≡ πt − ψkt = dtst + (1 +rb
t )bt − qt(st+1 − st) − bt+1.
Without loss of generality, we can set ψkt = 0. Thus, if for example (1 +rb
t )bt = bt+1, ie the subordinated debt is
rolled over each period, then the equation above becomes:
πt − dtst =− qt(st+1 − st).
If πt > dtst, then qt(st+1 − st)<0. This implies that banks do not keep retained earnings on their balance sheets as
cash. If not completely paid out as dividends, and if debt is rolled over, earnings are used to decrease liabilities (unless
banks decide to hold more capital to increase loan supply, as we will see later).
(9) See the appendix or Chami-Cosimano (2001) for a discussion of the condition under which the game played by
oligopolistic banks has a co-operative solution.






The bank maximises its value by choosing the loan rate, its level of deposits, its investment in
treasury securities, and its capital, subject to the cash-ﬂow constraint (5), the loan demand (6),t h e
ﬁnancing constraint (7) and the balance-sheet identity (8):
Max v(qt−1st + bt,xt) ={ πt + λt
 




























Lt = l0 −l1r
L
t +l2Mt + εL,t (6)






bt − πt (7)
Tt = (1 − α) Dt − Lt + qt−1st + bt (8)
(10)As observed by an anonymous referee, some models propose that ﬁrms’ demand for external funds (and thus for
bank loans) may increase following a fall in ﬁrms’ internal funds, ie when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate.
Here, I follow C-C in assuming a Hicksian loan demand that is an increasing function of GDP and a decreasing
function of the interest rate.
14In the value function, λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the capital constraint, τt is the deadweight
cost of capital(11) and mt,1 is a stochastic discount factor. In the proﬁt function, cL is the constant
marginal cost of loans (representing the cost of monitoring and screening), cD is a constant








is the cost of deposit withdrawals.(12)
The level of macroeconomic activity M, and the interest rate on deposits r D are assumed to follow
a ﬁrst-order autoregressive stochastic process:(13)






t + εrD,t+1 (10)
where εM,t+1, and εrD,t+1 are zero-mean stochastic shocks to economic activity and deposit rate,
respectively. One may think of εM,t+1 as a temporary shock to GDP, either a demand shock, for
example a temporary shift in government purchases or in consumer conﬁdence, or a supply shock,
for example an oil price shock.
When solving this problem, last period’s choice of capital is taken as given and determines
whether or not the capital constraint is binding this period. Further, it turns out that the solution of
the problem separates the bank’s desired capital from its other choices. Therefore, decisions on
loan interest rate, deposits and marketable securities can be analysed as in a static problem. When
the capital constraint is non-binding, the optimal level of loans occurs where the marginal revenue
(11)In the model there is no difference between the relative cost of raising subordinated debt versus equity.
(12)The cost of deposit withdrawals is obtained as follows:


















(13)The fact that shocks to macroeconomic conditions M and to deposit rate rD (which approximate monetary
policy) are not correlated means that the model does not have a well-deﬁned monetary policy rule. Otherwise, we
would expect shocks in M to affect r D. I owe this point to an anonymous referee.
15from loans is equal to the marginal cost of loans (point A in Figure 1 below). If there is an
increase in loan demand (an upward shift of the demand curve), both the quantity and the price of
loans (the interest rate rL) increase. If the marginal cost of loans decreases, the quantity of loans
will increase, while the interest rate will decrease.









However, if the capital constraint is binding and loans are at their ceiling L∗,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei n
the loan demand or a decrease in the marginal cost of loans do not affect the supply of credit but
only the loan rate, rL.
In deciding the amount of capital to hold, the bank compares the marginal deadweight cost of
capital, τ,with the expected marginal beneﬁt. The latter has two components. First, additional
equity (or subordinated debt) reduces the need for raising deposits in the next period. Second,
t h e r ei st h ee x p e c t e dm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt from the fact that the capital constraint is less likely to be
binding in the next period, λ
∗
t+1.(14)
The resulting optimal capital held by banks depends on a number of factors: (1) it is a negative
(14)The optimal bank capital is the solution to the ﬁrst-order condition that equates τ, the cost of capital, to the
expected marginal cost of deposits, which is the alternative source of ﬁnancing for the bank, plus λ∗
t+1,w h i c hi st h e
shadow value of the capital constraint (ie it represents the marginal increase in the optimal value of the objective
function of the bank if the capital constraint is relaxed).
16function of the expected marginal cost of external funds (which is equal to the difference between
the marginal deadweight cost of capital τ and the expected marginal beneﬁt of capital, as just
described); (2) a positive function of the expected demand for loans (which is, in turn, a function
of current economic conditions, due to the autoregressive nature of the stochastic process




within that of the deposit rate r D
t ; (4) a positive function of the volatility of loan demand; (5) a
negative function of the elasticity of the loan demand (bigger elasticity implies less monopoly
power); and (6) a positive function - under a parametric assumption - of the regulatory capital ratio
θ.
An increase in economic activity has a positive impact on the level of capital held by the bank. An
improvement in macroeconomic conditions increases the expected loan demand next period and
the probability that the capital constraint will become binding. The response of banks is to
increase capital to keep proﬁts at their maximum. The capital held by banks is therefore
procyclical, in the sense that it follows the level of expected loan demand, which is assumed to
depend on economic conditions.
3 Extension to the model and results
Two key features - and limitations - of the C-C model are that loans, which have a one-period
maturity, are always repaid in full and that the capit a lc o n s t r a i n ti si n d e p e n dent of macroeconomic
conditions. But what is interesting is the link between macroeconomic activity, loan defaults
(write-offs) and asset risk-weights. I therefore introduce two extensions. First, I consider the
possibility that bank borrowers can default on their principal payment. Moreover, the proportion
of defaulted debt is assumed to be a negative function of current macroeconomic conditions, ie
write-offs are higher when economic conditions are bad than when they are good. Bank loan
defaults translate into an extra cost term in the banks’ proﬁt function. As will become clear, unlike
in C-C, the marginal cost curve will now shift downwards (upwards) as macroeconomic
conditions improve (worsen). In other words, economic conditions affect loan supply as well as
demand. The second assumption I introduce is that the risk-weight assigned to loans in the capital
adequacy ratio is not constant, as in C-C, but is a decreasing function of current macroeconomic
conditions, as implied by Basel II.
17As regarding the ﬁrst assumption, there is evidence to support the notion that loan write-offs are
higher during recessions. Weak economic conditions are likely to be associated with a
deterioration in asset quality as borrowers’ ﬁnancial health weakens. Chart 1 shows the aggregate
annual net write-off to loan ratio, constructed from data published on the public accounts of the
major UK banks, and the (inverted) annual UK output gap(15) over the period 1978-2000. The two
series seem to follow the same pattern, with write-offs following the output gap with a lag.
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Per cent Per cent
+
_
Sources:  Bank of England; OECD Economic Outlook.
Chart 2 shows the annual aggregate net write-off to loan ratio together with (inverted) UK GDP
growth rate from 1988 to 2002. The chart conﬁrms the intuition of a countercyclical movement in
loan losses for the United Kingdom. Moreover, the negative correlation between bank losses and
the business cycle does not seem to be a unique feature of the UK economy. Borio, Furﬁne and
Lowe (2001) show evidence of a cyclical pattern of bank provisions for loan losses in many
OECD countries, with a particularly strong link between the provision to asset ratio and the output
gap in Australia, Sweden, Norway, Japan and Spain.
The assumption made in this paper is that write-offs react to the current value of M, which can be
thought of as a proxy for GDP. However, they depend on past macroeconomic conditions as well,
(15)As calculated by the OECD.
18given that M is described by an autoregressive process.



















2 Write-off/loan ratio (RHS)
(Inverted) GDP growth rate (LHS)
+
_
Per cent Per cent
Source: Bank of England.
The second assumption introduced here is that risk-weights vary with macroeconomic conditions.
In the revised Basel Accord banks are given the choice between two methodologies for calculating
their minimum capital requirements. Under the so-called standardised approach, exposures
included in banks’ retail portfolios would maintain a constant risk-weight(16) while external credit
assessments, such as credit scores by rating agencies, would be used to construct the risk-weights
for claims on sovereigns, banks, and corporates. In assessing a borrower’s creditworthiness, the
major rating agencies aim at maintaining a stable rating through the business cycle. There is,
however, evidence that credit ratings show a cyclical pattern with more downgrades than upgrades
during recessions (see, for example, Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2000)). Under the alternative
method (the internal ratings based approach) some banks will use their own credit ratings to
determine capital requirements. This approach might induce more cyclicality in risk-weights.
Most internal rating systems use a short-term horizon to measure risk. In particular, borrowers’
probability of default, which is one of the terms in the formula for risk-weights, is determined over
(16)Claims in the retail portfolio, which includes small businesses, credit cards, personal loans and leases, may be
risk-weighted at 75%, with the exception of loans secured by mortgages on residential property and past due loans.
Claims secured by residential property will be risk-weighted at 35%, while past due loans, which will have a
risk-weight of either 100% or 150%, depending on what percentange of the outstanding amount of the loan is covered
by speciﬁc provisions.
19a one-year period and borrowers are assigned to rating grades using models such as Moody’s
KMV.(17) A number of papers, including Catarineu-Rabell et al (2003) and Kashyap and Stein
(2004), have shown that this introduces considerable cyclicality in risk-weighted assets. In its
third Consultative Paper (CP3),(18) the Basel Committee has proposed ﬂatter risk-weight curves
for small and medium enterprises(19) as a way to address the concern that procyclicality will
increase under the IRB approach. This initiative will certainly dampen the volatility in capital
ratios but probably not eliminate it. Indeed, evidence presented in Kashyap and Stein (2004)
among others is based on the revised curves for corporate and SME credit. Our assumption
reﬂects the idea that, under the new Capital Accord, risk-weights might become more closely
related to current macroeconomic conditions.
3.1 Bank loan quantity and price responset oc h a n g i n gm a c r o e c o n o m i cc o n d i t i o n s
3.1.1 Case I: banks’ loan losses depend on macroeconomic conditions and asset risk-weights
are constant (Basel I)
In what follows I present the result of the model under the assumption that bank loans may not be
repaid, ie that borrowers can default. The proportion of defaulted debt is a negative function of
current macroeconomic conditions, ie write-offs are higher when economic conditions are bad
than when they are good. The risk-weight on loans is constant, as in Basel I.
In the model banks operate in an oligopolistic market for (risky) loans and invest in a safe asset
(treasury securities) for liquidity purposes. I solve the proﬁt maximisation problem for a
monopolist bank and, in the appendix, derive the condition under which banks co-operate and
equally share the proﬁts of the industry.(20)
The capital constraint that a bank faces when maximising its proﬁts is the following:
(17)See the discussion paper by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) for a survey on banks’ Internal
Ratings Systems.
(18)See BCBS (2003).
(19)For any given type of asset, these curves describe the relationship between the capital charge and the probability
of default.





where the risk-weight on treasuries (wT) is assumed to be zero and the one on loans (wL) is set
equal to 1.
The bank faces a downward sloping demand curve and equates marginal revenue to marginal cost
to ﬁnd the optimal quantity of loans Lt and the optimal loan rate r L
t , in each period t.
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2 − δ (Mt) Lt (12)
where δ (Mt) Lt represents defaulted loans. The default rate δ (21) varies between 0 and 1 and
increases when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, ie 0 ≤ δ (Mt) ≤ 1a n d
∂δ(Mt)
∂Mt < 0.
The objective is to analyse the impact on banks’ decisions of macroeconomic conditions when
losses depend on macroeconomic conditions and a risk-insensitive capital adequacy constraint,
described in (11), is in place. In order to achieve this, I need to solve for the optimal bank
allocation of assets between loans and treasuries, and liabilities between deposits and total capital
(equity plus subordinated debt). This is shown in the appendix. It is possible then to analyse how
bank capital and the quantity and price of loans are affected by changes in macroeconomic
conditions.
Proposition 1 Under the assumption of positive loan losses and constant asset risk-weights, banks
raise (decrease) their capital holdings in response to a positive (negative) shock in the current
level of economic activity.
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix. This result is similar to the one obtained in
C-C but here bank capital is more procyclical. This is because lending is more procyclical in a
model with loan losses, as will be shown in the next propositions.
(21)δ corresponds to the loss given default (LDG).
21We proceed now to establish the impact of changes in Mt on loans and loan rates. We present ﬁrst
the results under a non-binding capital constraint and then under a binding constraint.






































Proposition 2 When the capital constraint is non-binding, bank loans increase as a result of an
improvement in macroeconomic activity, while the loan rate can either increase or decrease
depending on the parameters characterising the loan demand function and the loan default rate.
The proof of this proposition follows directly from (13), (14) and the condition
∂δ(Mt+j)
∂Mt+j < 0.
When macroeconomic conditions improve, loan demand shifts to the right and, because default
rates decrease, the marginal cost curve shifts downwards.(22) The marginal cost curve moves
downwards (from MC1 to MC2 in Figure 2) and banks ﬁnd it proﬁtable to increase the supply of
loans. The rate charged on loans, however, can either increase or decrease depending on the
parameters characterising the loan demand and on the loan default rate. It is important to notice
that, when accounting for the possibility of loan defaults, the loan supply increases by more than
in the C-C model - to L2 rather than L2,CC in Figure 2 - in response to better macroeconomic
conditions, because the marginal cost curve shifts downwards at the same time the demand (and
the marginal revenue) curve shifts upwards.(23)








M < 0 (15)
(23)It should be noted that the impact of a change in macroeconomic conditions dies out over time, since ρ
j
M < 1, ie
the effect of the current value of M on future macroeconomic conditions declines over time.




















I consider now the case in which the capital constraint binds, ie λt > 0. In this case loan supply is















Proposition 3 When the capital constraint is binding, current bank lending does not change in
response to an improvement in macroeconomic activity. T h el o a nr a t eh o w e v e ri n c r e a s e sa sa
consequence of a higher loan demand.
The proof of this proposition follows immediately from (16) and (17).
23An increase in Mt causes an upward movement of the loan demand and a downward movement of
the marginal cost curve (see Figure 3). Banks are willing to increase their loan supply but they are
not are able to do so because they are capital-constrained. The loan rate increases up to r L.
















3.1.2 Case II: banks’ loan losses and asset risk-weights depend on macroeconomic conditions
(Basel II)
In this section analogous propositions to the ones in the previous section will be derived for a
model where both loan losses and loan risk-weigh t sa r eaf u n c t i o no fm a c roeconomic conditions
Mt.
The capital constraint is now described by the following expression:
θ ≤
qt−1st + bt
w(Mt) Lt + wTTt
(18)
where the risk-weight on treasuries (wT) is again assumed to be zero and the one on loans is a
24decreasing function of current macroeconomic conditions, ie
∂w(Mt)
∂Mt < 0.
Proposition 4 Under the assumption of positive loan losses and a risk-sensitive capital constraint,
banks can either raise or lower their capital holdings in response to a positive shock in the current
level of economic activity. Their choice depends on the effect that the change in Mt has on the
likelihood of the capital constraint binding next period.
The proof of this proposition is given in the appendix. This result is in contrast to the Basel I
model and provides an interesting implication for the policy debate about the risk that the new
capital standards may exacerbate the cyclicality of bank lending. If the critical shock to loan
demand, ε∗
L,t+1
(24) decreases when Mt increases, ie if the likelihood th a tt h ec a p i t a lc o n s t r a i n tw i l l
bind next period increases, then banks will choose to hold more capital to be able to grant more
loans next period. However, it is possible that
∂ε∗
L,t+1
∂Mt > 0, and that bank capital decreases (see the
appendix). The reason for this possibility is that, in the Basel II model, better macroeconomic
conditions have two counteracting effects on bank capital. On the one hand, since banks expect a
higher loan demand in the future, they want to be able to supply more loans. In order to be able to
increase their lending, they need to hold more capital. At the same time though, banks expect
lower risk-weights and, therefore, a higher capital to asset ratio, which makes it less likely that the
capital constraint will bind. Since holding capital entails a deadweight cost for banks, they have an
incentive to reduce the amount of capital. If the second effect dominates, banks will choose to
hold less capital. To summarise, once allowance ism a d ef o rv a r y i n gr i s k - w e i g h t si nt h ec a p i t a l
ratio, the impact of the current macroeconomic conditions on banks’ capital holdings is
ambiguous. In contrast to the model presented in the previous paragraph, a positive shock to Mt
does not necessarily induce banks to increase capital.
I turn now to the effect of a shock to Mt on bank loans and the loan rate, and analyse both cases:
when the capital constraint is slack and when it is binding.
When λt = 0, ie the constraint does not bind, then:
(24)In the appendix ε∗







































Proposition 5 Under the same assumptions of Proposition 4, and when the capital constraint is
non-binding, bank loans increase as a result of an improvement in macroeconomic activity. The
loan rate can either increase or decrease depending on the parameters characterising the loan
default rate and the loan demand function.
The proof of this proposition follows directly from (19), (20) and the condition
∂δ(Mt+j)
∂Mt+j < 0.
Clearly, when the capital constraint is non-binding, the models with constant and non-constant
risk-weights yield the same results as regards extension of loans. The impact on the quantity and
price of loans of a positive shock to Mt can be seen in Figure 2 above.
I consider now the case in which the capital constraint binds, ie λt > 0. By taking the ﬁrst























Proposition 6 Under the same assumptions of Proposition 4, and when the capital constraint is
binding, current bank lending incre a s e si nr e s p o n s et oa ni m p r o v e m e nt in macroeconomic activity.
The loan rate can either increase or decrease depending on the parameters characterising the
loan demand and the risk-weights.
26The proof of this proposition follows from (21), (22) and the assumption
∂w(Mt+j)
∂Mt+j < 0.
An increase in Mt induces both a slackening of the capital constraint and an upward shift of the
loan demand (see Figure 4). Banks are willing to increase their loan supply and are able to do so
because their capital ratio has increased. The direction of the change in the loan rate depends on
the elasticity of loan demand with respect to the loan rate, and the sensitivity of loan demand and
the risk-weight to macroeconomic conditions. The higher the sensitivity of loan demand to Mt (ie
the bigger the parameter l2), the more the loan rate tends to increase. The higher the elasticity of
loan demand and the sensitivity of risk-weights to Mt (ie the bigger l1 and
∂w(Mt)
∂Mt ) ,t h em o r et h e
loan rate tends to decrease. At the limit, if the positive shock to macroeconomic conditions makes
the capital constraint slack, loan supply goes from L∗ to L and the loan rate from r L∗
to r L in
Figure 4. If the capital constraint still binds, the equilibrium loan quantity will be somewhere
between L∗ and L and the loan rate between r L
CC and r L. This is in contrast to the Basel I model,
where loans would remain at L∗ throughout this exercise and the loan rate would respond by
moving from r L∗ to r L
CC.



















Finally, I analyse the effect of a current shock to macroeconomic conditions on bank loans and
27loan rates in future periods. This impact is analogous to the one on current loans and loan rates, ie
it depends on whether the capital constraint binds or not in future periods. If the capital constraint
is slack, the response of loans and loan rates in period j ≥ 1 to a current macroeconomic shock is
described by Proposition 4 but the impact of the shock dies out over time, since ρ
j
M < 1.
If the capital constraint binds in future periods, the response of loans and loan rates to a change in






































































Therefore, future bank loans can either increase or decrease in response to a positive shock to
current macroeconomic conditions depending on the relative magnitudes of the terms in the
right-hand side of equation (23). Recall that Proposition 4 tells us that under Basel II capital does
not necessarily increase in response to a positive shock to Mt. If capital decreases in response to a
positive shock to macroeconomic conditions, loans can decrease as well, provided that the ﬁrst
term in the curly brackets in (23) is bigger than the second term, ie that the effect of the shock on
capital dominates the effect of the shock on loan risk-weights. Finally, the sign of the change in
loan rates is undetermined, as it can be seen from equation (24).
As a summary of the results of the paper, Table A below shows the effect of a positive shock to
macroeconomic conditions on banks’ lending under the two capital adequacy regimes (Basel I and
Basel II).
28Table A: Responses to a positive shock to macroeconomic conditions
Loans Loan rate Bank capital
Basel I, non-binding capital constraint 
+ + +
Basel I, binding capital constraint 
=+  ++
Basel II, non-binding capital constraint 
+ +
Undetermined, 
lower than in the 
Basel I model
Basel II, binding capital constraint 
+
Undetermined, 
lower than in the 
Basel I model
Undetermined, 
lower than in the 
Basel I model
In both versions of the model presented here, there are two cases: with the current capital
constraint binding, and with it non-binding. In the Basel I model, both bank loans and loan rate
increase in response to a positive shock to Mt, when the capital constraint is not binding. If instead
the capital constraint binds, an upward shift of the loan demand will induce an increase in the loan
rate, which will be higher than in the unconstrained case, but leave the loan supply unchanged.
Moreover, since a positive shock to macroeconomic conditions increases the likelihood that the
capital will be binding in the future, banks increase the amount of capital they hold.
In the Basel II model, a shock to current macroeconomic conditions affects not only the loan
demand but also the risk-weights in banks’ capital to asset ratios. If the capital constraint is slack,
bank loans increase by the same amount than in the Basel I model. If the capital constraint is
binding, then, unlike under Basel I, banks can still expand their credit supply, even though by less
than if the capital is non-binding. They area b l et od os ob e c a u s eap o s i t i v es h o c kt o
macroeconomic conditions induces lower risk-weights and therefore a slackening of the capital
constraint. The loan rate can either increase or decrease, depending on the relative size of the
change in loan demand and capital ratio. Analogously, a negative shock to macroeconomic
conditions results in a possibly greater reduction of credit than in the Basel I model because of
both a downward shift of the loan demand and a tightening of the capital constraint.
29Moreover, under Basel II, the sign of the change in banks’ capital holding is undetermined as a
positive shock to Mt has two counteracting effects on the equilibrium value of bank capital. On
the one hand, a positive macroeconomic shock has a persistent positive effect on loan demand and
therefore raises the likelihood of the capital constraint binding in the future. At the same time,
however, the capital ratio increases so that the likelihood that the capital constraint will bite
becomes lower.
4 Concluding remarks
The model by Chami and Cosimano analyses, among other things, the effect of macroeconomic
shocks on bank capital holding. Their conclusion is that capital - the numerator in the capital
adequacy ratio - is procyclical. An improvement in macroeconomic conditions induces an increase
in the loan demand and, as a consequence, an increase in the probability that the capital constraint
will become binding. The response of banks is to increase capital to maximise proﬁts. Thus, a
bank’s capital is procyclical because it changes according to expected loan demand, which is
assumed to be a function of the current level of macroeconomic activity.
By extending the model to include loan default and loan risk-weights as variables depending on
macroeconomic activity, I introduce two other ‘channels’ through which economic conditions
affect banks’ capital and lending. The ﬁrst channel is active under any capital adequacy regime:
empirical evidence supports the assumption that better macroeconomic conditions reduce the loan
default rate and thus the loan marginal cost. This implies a greater variability in loan supply than
in the C-C economy, where loans are default free.
Under Basel II, a macroeconomic shock will also affect the loan risk-weights in the capital to asset
ratio. As a result, the capital constraint might become either tighter, if the shock is negative, or
looser, if the shock is positive. Therefore, if banks face a binding capital constraint, they will be
able to increase their loan supply in response to better macroeconomic conditions but they might
be forced to reduce supply if the shock is negative. By contrast, in the model with constant
risk-weights, a shock affects only the loan rate while leaving the loan supply unchanged when the
capital constraint binds.
The other implication of risk-sensitive weights àl aBasel II is that banks do not necessarily
30increase their capital in response to a positive macroeconomic shock. Similarly, a deterioration of
macroeconomic conditions does not necessarily induce banks to decrease their capital. This
happens because macroeconomic conditions not only affect loan demand but also banks’ capital
constraint. Since a positive shock induces a decrease in the asset risk-weights, and thus an
increase in capital ratios, banks do not necessarily need to raise new capital to expand their loan
supply. Analogously, since a negative shock tightens the capital constraint, a reduction in loan
demand does not necessarily induce banks to decrease their capital.
Said differently, under Basel II banks might not have the necessity to maintain the same level of
capital during periods of high economic activity as under Basel I. For this reason banks might be
more vulnerable to unexpected negative shocks. If the economy falls into a recession or
experiences a weakening in its growth, it will be more likely for banks’ capital constraint to be
binding and thus for credit to be rationed.
These ﬁndings may have implications for public policy. Risk-sensitive weights may lead to a
greater reduction of credit following a negative macroeconomic shock. Not only will loan demand
fall during an economic downturn but banks may be forced to reduce loan supply to satisfy tighter
capital requirements. In order to avoid such an eventuality, supervisors may therefore want to
encourage banks to maintain a capital buffer (during the periods of strong economic growth)
above the one banks would choose voluntarily. Indeed, such an approach has been favoured by the
Basel Committee and is recommended under Pillar 2 of the new Accord (the Supervisory Review
Process). Under the Supervisory Review Process, banks may in fact be required to hold more
capital than the regulatory minimum as a protection against risks, including the potential impact of
an economic downturn, which are not fully captured by Pillar 1. Alternatively, cyclicality in
capital requirements could be addressed under Pillar 1, eg by adjusting capital requirements in
response to changes in macroeconomic conditions, as proposed by Kashyap and Stein (2004) and
Gordy and Howells (2004).
31Appendix
The bank’s optimisation problem
Here I present the model with loan losses and asset risk-weights that depend on macroeconomic
conditions.
Banks’ balance sheet identity is:
Lt + Tt = (1 − α)Dt + qt−1st + bt (A-1)
while banks’ cash ﬂows are given by (12).




v(qt−1st + bt,xt) ={ πt + λt
 
















t Tt − cLLt −r
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2 − δ (Mt) Lt (A-3)



















or dividends dt is equivalent.
32Lt = l0 −l1r
L
t +l2Mt + εL,t (A-4)






bt − πt (A-5)
Tt = (1 − α) Dt + qt−1st + bt − Lt (A-6)
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λt : θw(Mt)Lt ≤ qt−1st + bt (A-9)
qtst+1 + bt+1 : −τ + Et













When the capital constraint does not bind (ie λt = 0), I can substitute (A-10) into (A-7) and (A-8),




















t (1 − α) −r
D









θw(Mt)Lt − qt−1st + bt < 0 (A-13)






































From (A-11), I obtain the following expression for the treasury bonds:









































l0 +l2Mt + εL,t
















































































The amount of treasuries is unaffected by the binding capital constraint:




















































































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
In order to prove Proposition 1, which refers to the case where risk-weights are constant, I set
w(Mt) = 1 and derive the relevant results.
Condition (A-10) describes the optimal capital holdings as an implicit function of the other
variables in the bank’s maximisation problem. I need a few steps before being able to use the
implicit function theorem. First I solve for the critical shock to the loan demand, ε∗
L,t , such that
t h et o t a lc a p i t a lc o n s t r a i n tw i l lj u s tb i n d ,i eLt = L∗
t. To do so, I equate the optimal loans from the















I can obtain λ∗


























By applying the envelope theorem to the value function in (A-2),Ig e t :
36∂V























L,t ≤ εL,t ≤ L
(A-27)
Thus, by updating the previous expression by one period and plugging it into the optimal



























Let’s denote the left-hand side of (A-28) as H. By the implicit function theorem I know that:




∂H/∂ (qtst+1 + bt+1)
(A-29)






























































This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Condition (A-10) describes the optimal capital holdings as an implicit function of the other
variables in the bank’s maximisation problem. I need a few steps before being able to use the

















I can obtain λ∗


























By applying the envelope theorem to the value function in (A-2),Ig e t :
38∂V























L,t ≤ εL,t ≤ L
(A-36)
Thus, by updating the previous expression by one period and plugging it into the optimal




























Let’s denote the left-hand side of (A-37) as H. By the implicit function theorem I know that:




∂H/∂ (qtst+1 + bt+1)
(A-38)


























































































This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.
Conditions for the banking industry co-operative equilibrium
To characterise the equilibrium in the banking industry, I need to ﬁnd the condition under which
co-operative (ie monopolistic) loan pricing by banks dominates Bertrand (price) competition.
Assuming a symmetric game, each bank earns 1
N of the total proﬁts of the industry πt.U n d e r
co-operative behaviour t h ev a l u eo ft h eb a n ki svC
t . If a bank charges a lower rate than its
competitors, it will get a larger share of the market and make πU
t (though the cheating bank will
not capture the entire market because capital constraints will put a ceiling on the amount of loans
it can supply). However, other banks react by following Bertrand competition such that the penalty






Therefore, banks co-operate as long as the proﬁts yielded by charging a lower rate then the
competitors is not higher than those obtained by co-operating.
C-C describe a possible equilibrium strategy as follows: each bank charges the monopoly loan
rate, raises 1
N of the industry capital qt−1st + bt, supplies 1
N of total loans and earns 1
N of the
industry proﬁts, as long as no other bank deviates from this strategy. If a bank deviates by setting
the loan rate equal to r L
t −η,w h e r erL
t is the monopoly rate and η is positive and small, the beneﬁt
from loan rate cutting is restricted by the regulatory constraint on loans 1
Nθw(Mt) (qt−1st + bt). Said
differently, when the capital constraint is binding, there is no beneﬁt from undercutting, and when
the capital constraint is slack the additional sales are only
1
Nθw(Mt) (qt−1st + bt) −
1
N Lt.




















t is the competitive loan rate, and is equal to the marginal cost of loans:
r
L,c




+ δ (Mt) (A-43)
If a bank deviates and cuts the loan rate, the other banks switch to a punishment strategy and set
the loan rate equal to the competitive level indeﬁnitely. In this case, for each period
j = t + 1,t + 2,...∞, the deviating bank (and all the others) would earn zero proﬁt. Therefore,




mt,1v (qtst+1 + bt+1,xt+1)
 
. A bank optimally
deviates from the co-operative equilibrium only if
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mt,1v (qtst+1 + bt+1,xt+1)
 
(A-44)
where  t is the proﬁt under co-operative behaviour. The right-hand side of (A-44) is independent













The maximum gain in proﬁt can be found by taking the derivative of (A-45) with respect to loans.


















(26)We are not considering the components of the proﬁts, as given by equation (5), that do not depend on loans Lt.I n
fact, those terms cancel out when writing the condition for the existence of a co-operative equilibrium.
41and, at this level of loans, the proﬁtg a i ni se q u a lt o
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Therefore, if (A-44) does not hold at a level of loans equal to 1
4L∗
t, then a bank will never deviate




exists a neighbourhood around this quantity of loans such that a bank may deviate from the
co-operative strategy and undercut the loan rate.
In conclusion, in the banking industry the capital constraint limits banks’ ability to satisfy a larger
share of loan demand at a lower loan rate. And it is precisely when demand is higher that the
capital constraint is more likely to bind, ie during booms. Thus, capital requirements yield greater
incentives for collusive behaviour.
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